Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2

Article 14

Spring 2001

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases:
Insurance Law
Michael J. Daly
Roger Williams University School of Law

Joseph Proietta
Roger Williams University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Recommended Citation
Daly, Michael J. and Proietta, Joseph (2001) "2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Insurance Law," Roger Williams University Law
Review: Vol. 6: Iss. 2, Article 14.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol6/iss2/14

This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

20011

SURVEY SECTION

Insurance Law. Fleet ConstructionCo. v. Aetna Life & Casualty
Co., 746 A.2d 1247 (R.I. 2000). Absent a statutory or contractual
duty to the contrary, an insurer is under no duty to its customers
to charge them the lowest or most competitive bond premium
rates. Furthermore, an insured cannot maintain a cause of action
against its insurer merely for charging them unfavorable rates.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In Fleet ConstructionCo. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.,' Fleet
Construction Co. (Fleet), brought an action in superior court
against its insurer, Aetna Life and Casualty Co. (Aetna), and insurance agent, Goodrich-Blessing Agency, Inc. (Goodrich). 2 As a
prerequisite to performing certain construction projects, Fleet was
required to obtain bonding and other insurance coverage. Goodrich placed the requisite coverage on behalf of Fleet with Aetna.3
The defendants in this case relied on a rating system that provided
for multiple contractor ratings based on the level of complexity and
difficulty of projects performed by the contractor. 4 Fleet claimed
that it was entitled to the less expensive Class A rating because of
the less complex and difficult nature of the work it performed. 5
However, Fleet asserted that it was wrongly charged premiums at
6
the more expensive Class B rate.
Fleet filed a five-count complaint against the defendants seeking reimbursement for the amounts overcharged and for lost profits. 7 Counts one through four concerned overcharged premiums. s
Count five concerned lost profits that Fleet claims to have suffered
because it was not the low bidder on several projects as a result of
the defendants' overcharges. 9 Goodrich filed a breach of contract
counterclaim alleging that Fleet owed it $42,784 for unpaid premium costs. 10
1. 746 A.2d 1248 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at n.1 (employing the rating system used by the Surety Association
of America's Rate Manual of Fidelity, Forgery and Surety Bonds (March 2, 1987
and July 15, 1977 Revisions)).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1248-49.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 1249.
10. See id.
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Defendants, Goodrich and Aetna, moved for partial summary
with respect to counts one through four. 1 The defendants
claimed, and Fleet admitted, that all premium costs were reimbursed by the parties who awarded contracts to Fleet, hence, Fleet
had suffered no damage as a result of any alleged overcharging. 12
A superior court motion justice agreed with the defendants and
granted their motion for partial summary judgment.' 3 Thereafter,
the defendants moved for partial summary judgment with respect
to count five, claiming that they owed no duty to Fleet to charge
them the lowest premium rates for construction bonds or charge
them Class A rather than Class B rates. 4 Fleet countered that the
defendants' breach of duty was their misclassification of projects as
Class B rather than Class A.' 5 A different superior court motion
justice agreed with the defendants and granted their motion. 16
Goodrich then moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid premiums.' 7 The motion was identical to one that
was filed and denied prior to the granting of partial summary judgments concerning counts one through five.' Fleet objected to the
motion arguing that it was barred by the law of the case doctrine.' 9
However, a superior court motion justice granted the motion because the granting of the defendants' earlier motions for summary
judgment had dramatically changed the state of the record. 20 The
granting of the summary judgment motions negated any of Fleet's
possible defenses to Goodrich's breach of contract counterclaim.
Accordingly, Goodrich's motion for summary judgment was
21
granted.
On appeal, Fleet argued that the motions below were erroneously granted. 2 2 Concerning counts one through four, Fleet
claimed that the lower court's finding that the defendants owed
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1248.
id.
id. at 1249.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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them no duty to charge the lower rates was erroneous. 23 Fleet also
claimed that it was in fact damaged by the defendants' overcharges
by making its business less competitive and causing it to "lose at
least one lucrative contract." 24 Relying on the collateral source
doctrine, Fleet contended that the defendants, as tortfeasors,
"should not be permitted to reap the benefit of an injured party's
ability to recoup some of its losses from a third party." 5 Fleet asserted that it should not matter that its insurance costs were
passed along to its customers and that the defendants should not
escape liability merely because Fleet had received benefits from
26
third parties.
With respect to count five, Fleet again claimed that the lower
court erroneously concluded that the defendants owed no duty to
correctly classify its bond rates. 27 Finally, with respect to Goodrich's counterclaim, Fleet argued that an earlier denial of Goodrich's motion for summary judgment precluded a subsequent grant
28
of the same motion.
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's
29
granting of the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Counts One Through Four-The "Wrong" Rates.
The court held that an insurer, absent a statutory or contractual duty to the contrary, owes no duty to its clients to charge the
lowest or best premium rates for bond coverage. 30 Without an express promise to do so, an insurer need not offer coverage at the
most competitive rates. 3 1 As the established rates did not violate
any law or contractual provision, the defendants breached no duty
23. Id. at 1249-50.
24, See id. at 1249.

25.

Id. at 1249.

26.
27.
28.
29.

See
See
See
See

id. at 1249-50.
id. at 1250.
id. at 1251.
id.

30. See id. at 1250.
31.

See id.
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owed to Fleet.3 2 If Fleet was not happy with the rates offered by
the defendants, they were free to obtain coverage elsewhere. 3 3
Arguing that it should not matter that their insurance costs
were passed on to its customers, Fleet claimed that the collateralsource doctrine should prevent the defendants from escaping liability merely because their customers had reimbursed them for the
alleged overcharging. 3 4 The collateral source doctrine requires a
negligent party to pay the full amount of damages suffered by the
injured party regardless of any amounts received by the injured
party from a third party.3 5 While not questioning that the collateral source doctrine is followed in Rhode Island, the supreme court
held it inapplicable in this case because the defendants had com36
mitted no tort.
Count Five-Lost Profits
The supreme court held that the defendants owed no duty to
Fleet to classify Fleet's projects as Class A and charge the corresponding lower rates. 37 The court noted that that imposition of
such a duty would transform the insurance industry to one of public welfare. 38 Accordingly, the court held that the defendants had
no duty to sell coverage at the most competitive rates or classify a
project in any particular manner. 39 Further, an insurer is under
no duty to charge "similarly situated" customers the same rate.40
Counterclaim-UnpaidPremiums
The supreme court upheld the superior court's grant of Goodrich's second motion for summary judgment with respect to its
breach of contract counterclaim. 4 1 Although Goodrich's same motion had previously been denied, the subsequent events justified
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at
35. See id.
36. See id. at
37. See id. at
38. See id. at
(R.I. 1986)).
39. See id. at
40. Id.
41. See id. at

1249-50
1250.
1250-51.
1250 (quoting Dubreuil v. Allstate Ins. Co. 511 A.2d 300, 302
1250-51.
1251.

SURVEY SECTION

20011

the later grant. 42 The grant of summary judgment with respect to
counts one through five sufficiently changed the status of the record when the second motion was filed and granted. 4 3 As the defendants had breached no duty owed to Fleet and Fleet suffered no
damage as a result of the alleged overcharging, any possible defenses to Goodrich's breach of contract counterclaim necessarily
vanished. 44
CONCLUSION

In Fleet Construction Co., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island made clear that an insurer, absent
a statutory or contractual duty to the contrary, is under no duty to
its customers to charge the lowest or most competitive bond premium rates. Hence, an insured cannot maintain a cause of action
against its insurer for charging unfavorable rates.
The court also made clear that the law of the case doctrine
does not automatically prevent a previously denied motion for
summary judgment from being granted. A trial court justice may
reconsider and grant a previously denied motion if interim facts
sufficiently change the record so as to justify the subsequent grant.
Michael J. Daly

42.
43.
44.

See id.
See id.
See id.
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Insurance Law. Lombardi v. Rhode Island Insurers, 751 A.2d
1275 (R.I. 2000). Before recovering from the Insurers' Insolvency
Fund, an insurance guarantee association, an insured is not required to first exhaust the insurance of his or her creditor or mortgagee. Where the insured is a stranger to those relationships he
will derive no benefit from the creditor's policies, and will remain
liable on the original promissory note. An insured's interests in an
insurance policy are not forfeited merely because the insured's
name did not appear as loss payee in the contract.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Plaintiff Arlene D. Lombardi (Lombardi) was the owner of a
two family dwelling located on Gendron Street in West Warwick,
Rhode Island, when, in November 1990, the building was significantly damaged by a fire.1 The premises was insured by a policy
issued by American Universal Insurance Group (American).2 The
limit of insurance coverage under the policy was $75,000 for prop3
erty loss, plus $5,000 for debris removal, less a $500 deductible.
At the time of the fire, Colonial Bank (Colonial) held a mortgage on
the premises in accordance with a promissory note and mortgage
given by Lombardi in the amount of $75,000, for which approximately $68,540 remained outstanding. 4 Colonial was designated
the loss payee under the terms of the insurance policy. 5 As a result
of the fire, the premises incurred damage in excess of the policy
limits. 6

Later,
7

in

January

1991,

American

was

declared

insolvent.
In October 1991, Lombardi filed a breach of contract action
against American.8 Because of American's insolvency, the parties
stipulated that the Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund (Fund)
be substituted as a party defendant for American. 9
Thereafter, Colonial was placed into receivership and its assets came under the control of the Resolution Trust Company (Res1. See Lombardi v. R.I. Insurers, 751 A.2d 1275, 1275 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 1275-76.
4. See id. at 1276.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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olution).' 0 Included in Colonial's assets was an insurance policy in
the amount of $1,000,000 issued by Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's) that
purportedly covered the loss on Lombardi's note.1 1
The superior court, sitting without a jury, held that the clause
in the mortgage pursuant to the standard Rhode Island fire insur12
ance contract created two separate and independent contracts:
one contract between the mortgagor and the insurer, and one contract between the mortgagee and the insurer. 13 Therefore, Lombardi had a separate and independent cause of action against her
insolvent insurer for breach of contract.14 The trial justice ordered
the Fund to pay Lombardi $79,500, and subsequently denied defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that Lombardi was not
15
the real party in interest.
The Fund appealed. Before the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
the Fund argued that Lombardi was not the real party in interest
and that her claim should be dismissed on the clause in the insurance contract that lists Colonial as the loss payee.16 The defendant
further argued that, although Colonial is the appropriate payee
under the policy, pursuant to section 27-34-12(a) of the Rhode Island Insurers' Fund Act, Colonial must first exhaust its own insurance policies before it is entitled to recovery. 17 The Rhode Island
Insurers Fund Act provides: "any person having a claim against an
insurer under any provision in an insurance policy other than a
policy of an insolvent insurer which is also a covered claim, shall be
required to exhaust first his or her right under that policy."' 8 The
Fund argued that since Colonial has $1,000,000 worth of coverage
available from Lloyd's, that coverage must first be exhausted. 1 9

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id. at n.2. (quoting R.I.
Reenactment)).
19. See id.

Gen. Laws

§ 27-34-12(a)

(1956)

(1998
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The court stated that the purposes of the Fund were to provide
a mechanism for the payment of covered claims, to avoid excessive
delay in payment, to avoid financial loss to claimants and to create
an entity to assess the cost of the protection and distribute it equitably among member insurers. 20 The Fund is obliged to assume all
the obligations that the insured would have had if not for its insolvency. 2 1 "The paramount responsibility of an insurer is to at all
times act in the best interests of its insured to protect the insured
22
from loss and excess liability."
The court declined, as a matter of public policy, to extend section 27-34-12(a) to require an insured whose insurer has been declared insolvent to look to any outstanding policies of the insured's
creditor merely because the creditor is the loss payee under the
policy.23 The court held that it will not require:
an insured who has made timely premium payments, and
who suffers a loss under [a] policy, to first exhaust the insurance of his or her creditor or mortgagee where the insured is
a stranger to those relationships, will derive no benefit from
the creditor's policies, and will remain liable on the original
24
promissory note.
The court further held that Lombardi was a real party in interest. 25 At the time of the fire, Lombardi was insured up to
$79,500 and only $68,540 was owing on the note, leaving a difference of approximately $11,000.26 Although Lombardi subsequently defaulted on the note because of her inability to continue
making payments after losing the income that the property pro27
duced, at the time of the loss Lombardi was not in default.
Therefore, the court held, her interest in the insurance proceeds at
the time was both real and significant, and Lombardi's interests
were not forfeited simply because her name did not appear as a
28
"loss payee" under the policy.
20. See id. at 1277.
21.

See id.

22. Id.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See
Id.
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 1277-78.
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CONCLUSION

In Lombardi v. Rhode Island Insurers, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Rhode Island Insurers' Fund Act does
not require an insured who has made timely premium payments,
and who has suffered a loss under a policy, to first exhaust the
insurance of his or her creditor or mortgagee where the insured is
a stranger to those relationships, will derive no benefit from the
creditor's policies, and will remain liable on the original promissory note. The court also held that an insured's interests in an
insurance policy are not forfeited merely because the insured's
name did not appear as loss payee in the contract.
Joseph Proietta

